Public law theory and judicial review in Singapore: Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v AG [2013] SGCA 56 by ONG, Benjamin Joshua
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
12-2013
Public law theory and judicial review in Singapore:
Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v AG [2013] SGCA
56
Benjamin Joshua ONG
Singapore Management University, benjaminjong@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons
This Transcript is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
ONG, Benjamin Joshua. Public law theory and judicial review in Singapore: Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v AG [2013] SGCA 56.






       
Issue 1/Dec 2013 
Public law theory and judicial review in Singapore 
Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General [2013] SGCA 56 
Benjamin Joshua Ong∗ 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court’s ruling that the applicant had no locus standi 
to challenge the compatibility of a loan made by the Government to the International 
Monetary Fund with Art 144(1) of the Constitution. On the interpretation of Art 144(1), there 
was no prima facie case of reasonable suspicion that such incompatibility existed. Moreover, 
the applicant did not have sufficient interest in the matter. 
 
Facts and decision 
In Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General (“Jeyaretnam”), the applicant had 
sought judicial review of a loan by the Government to the International Monetary Fund on 
the grounds that it allegedly violated Art 144(1) of the Constitution, which provides that “[n]o 
guarantee or loan shall be given or raised by the Government” without the authority of a 
resolution of Parliament with the President’s concurrence or the authority of written law. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s ruling that the applicant had no locus standi to 
do so on the grounds that: 
(a) there was no prima facie case of reasonable suspicion: a purposive reading of 
Art 144(1), in the light of relevant extrinsic materials, showed that it only restricted 
the giving of guarantees and the raising of loans, but not the giving of loans; and 
(b) the applicant did not have sufficient interest in the matter: no “private right” 
of his had been violated, nor had a “public right” been violated in such a way to cause 
him “special damage peculiar to himself”1. 
Additionally, on the facts, the Court rejected arguments that the loan was “like a guarantee” 
or entailed an “implied guarantee”. 
                                                          
∗ Final-year student reading for the B.A. in Jurisprudence at the University of Oxford.  
1 Jeyaretnam, [62], citing Boyce v Paddington Borough Council [1903] 1 Ch 109, 114. 
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Several notable points emerge; perhaps the most interesting is the Court of Appeal’s 
explicitly endorsing the green-light theory of public law. Such endorsement is seen from the 
Court’s explicit recognition that locus standi is a “judge-made” doctrine2, i.e. the Court had 
the power to change the law on locus standi, yet refused to do so.  
Introduction: the red-light and green-light theories 
Harlow and Rawlings’ red-light and green-light models of the relationship between the 
courts and the executive were summarised by then-Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong as follows: 
the red-light view sees the courts as “locked in an adversarial or combative relationship with 
the Executive”, while the green-light view “sees public administration not as a necessary evil 
but a positive attribute” and focuses on “seek[ing] good government through the political 
process and public avenues rather than redress[ing] bad government3 through the courts”4. 
To elaborate, the red-light theory is that the courts should take the lead in “control[ling] 
excesses of state power”5 because they are well-placed to act as an external check, while the 
green-light view is that this is not necessarily so – the courts may be seen as “legalistic” or 
having an “eccentric vision of the ‘public interest’”6 – whereas political checks such as 
accountability through Parliament and ministerial supervision are often better7, such that 
the courts should focus on “permit[ting] the administration to regulate itself”8. 
By tracing the history of the theories, Harlow and Rawlings suggest that they are descriptive 
models. However, in Jeyaretnam, the Court not only declared that the green-light theory has 
been said (in Vellama d/o Marie Muthu v Attorney-General9 (“Vellama”)) to represent the 
situation in Singapore10, but also proceeded on the basis that it should prevail. As is argued 
below, this is evident throughout the Court’s reasoning even when the theory was not 
specifically mentioned. At the same time, if the green-light theory is accorded prescriptive 
weight, then it is necessary to examine exactly what implications it has for the courts’ role in 
Singapore public law; it is hoped that this note will offer some thoughts on this matter. 
Interpretation of Art 144(1) 
A traditional view is that the objective of the interpretation of written law is to determine the 
meaning of a provision as it was enacted, such that only extrinsic materials dating from the 
time of enactment or before are relevant. In Jeyaretnam, however, an Opinion by the 
Attorney-General long after Art 144 had been enacted was referred to; it was said by the High 
                                                          
2 Jeyaretnam, [33]. 
3 This references CJ Chan’s distinction at [6] between “governance”, i.e. the procedure by which policies are 
implemented, which is to be controlled by judicial review; and “government”, i.e. the policies themselves, which 
are to be controlled by democratic processes. 
4 Chan, “Judicial Review – From Angst to Empathy” (2010) 22 SAcLJ 469, [29] 
5 Harlow and Rawlings, Law and Administration, 3rd ad (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 23. 
6 Harlow and Rawlings, Law and Administration, 2nd ed (Butterworths, 1997), 74; quoted in Beatson, Matthews, 
and Elliott, Administrative Law, 4th ed (Oxford University Press, 2011), 3. 
7 Supra n 5, 39ff. 
8 Beatson et al, supra n 6, 5. 
9 [2013] 4 SLR 1. 
10 Jeyaretnam, [48]. 
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Court to have been “endorsed by the Government… and circulated to Members of 
Parliament”11 but said by the Court of Appeal to have been “endorsed by Parliament”12. In 
fact, the Opinion was not aimed directly at the motion being debated at the time, which was 
that “this House regrets that the Executive does not respect the Judiciary as the final arbiter 
in the application of all laws passed by Parliament”13; neither was legislation passed directly 
in reliance on the Opinion. This means that any endorsement by Parliament must have been 
by silence or tacit consent. 
By referring to the Opinion, the courts put the green-light theory into action by locating 
legislative intent in the ongoing practice or attitude of the Legislature (including tacit 
endorsement of Executive practice simply by virtue of having received a copy of the Opinion 
and not expressing disagreement) rather than in the intention at the time when the 
legislation was made. In other words, Parliament was seen as playing an active role in the 
development and operation of the law rather than just the making of the law. 
The significance of this is seen in that, because of the way in which the case was pleaded, the 
Court’s discussion centred around whether the loan created a “liability” on the part of the 
Government14: the concepts of assets and liabilities are mentioned in the Opinion15, not 
Art 144(1). (As an aside: the applicant could have instead chosen to contest the High Court’s 
construction of Art 144(1)16 rather than how it applied to the loan; this demonstrates that the 
task of interpretation permeates judicial review proceedings even at the leave stage.) 
The validity of the loan  
The theme of focusing on Parliament’s ongoing practice is also seen in the issue of the 
application of Art 144(1). The applicant evidently sought to argue that Art 144(1) was a 
validity criterion, breach of which made the loan void ab initio. The Court, by contrast, 
stressed that “neither Parliament nor the President had thought fit to question the propriety 
of the promised loan. If the President was indeed concerned and inclined to veto the 
commitment, he would have done so.”17 In other words, the Court saw ongoing 
Parliamentary/Presidential approval as a condition subsequent rather than seeing approval 
at the time the loan was made as a condition precedent; the correct remedy would thus be 
prospective rather than ab initio annulment. By encouraging Parliamentary debate on 
whether the loan “should have been granted” (emphasis added)18, the Court thought that any 
potential problems would stem from the fact that the loan continued to exist rather than the 
formal steps taken when the loan was made. Again, this ties in with the green-light theory of 
encouraging the role of Parliament in monitoring the propriety of ongoing administrative 
action. 
                                                          
11 [2013] 1 SLR 619, [20]. 
12 Jeyaretnam, [7(b)]. 
13 Singapore Parliamentary Reports, vol 68, col 72ff (1998). 
14 Jeyaretnam, [19]ff. 
15 Reproduced in [2013] 1 SLR 619, [19(4)-(5)]. 
16 For example, it could have been argued that reliance on the AG’s opinion was inappropriate. 
17 Jeyaretnam, [61]. 
18 Ibid. 
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Rights, remedies, and public law theory 
The criticism may be made that focusing on what happens after the law is enacted allows the 
Legislature to license retroactively behaviour which may have previously been prima facie 
contrary to law. That may be true in some cases, but, by the Court’s reasoning, there was no 
problem in Jeyaretnam because the applicant was held to have suffered no loss, having had 
no relevant right: the matter here concerned “public policy” rather than the “individual’s 
rights and interests”19. 
It may be tempting simply to equate this view with the green-light theory, but it is submitted 
that it is instead necessary to unpack the phrase “public policy”, which may refer to any of 
the following three points (all of which the Court referenced): 
(a) Matters for which the correct remedies are political, not legal.20 
(b) Matters which give rise to rights held in common with the public, rather than 
private rights – in the case of the former, one must have suffered “special damage” in 
order to have locus standi.21 
(c) Matters which are within the discretion of the Legislature and the Executive22 
(in CJ Chan’s terms, matters of “government” rather than “governance”23). 
The requirement of “special damage” (point (b) above) does not mean that there is no legal 
remedy (point (a) above); it means that it is for the Attorney-General representing the 
public, rather than the individual, to seek a legal remedy.24 It is only from the applicant’s 
point of view that the correct step is to pursue the political remedy of asking the Attorney-
General to seek a legal remedy before the courts. This explains why, in Vellama, the 
applicant had no locus standi and yet the courts were competent to rule on the merits: the 
applicant there was trying to vindicate a public right without the Attorney-General’s help25, 
but it was still a legal and not a political matter and thus justiciable. 
In addition, even in the UK where the red-light theory was said to apply26 (before the Human 
Rights Act 1998, which paved the way for review of the proportionality of action which prima 
facie infringes human rights, which entails merits review), the courts still drew the 
distinction in point (c) above between merits and legality review.27 
In other words, the application may well have failed at the leave stage even if the red-light 
theory had applied in Singapore. This is because the fact that the application failed the 
                                                          
19 Jeyaretnam, [56]. 
20 Jeyaretnam, [61]. 
21 Jeyaretnam, [37]. 
22 Jeyaretnam, [59]. 
23 Supra n 3. 
24 Jeyaretnam, [35]-[36]; [39]. 
25 The applicant was originally asserting the private right of seeking advice from an MP, but, by the time the 
Court of Appeal ruled, an MP had already been elected to replace the one who have been removed, leaving her 
only with the public right of democratic representation in general: [2013] 4 SLR 1, [38]. 
26 Jeyaretnam, [49]; [55]. 
27 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 
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“reasonable suspicion” test was purely a matter of the interpretation of Art 144, to which the 
green-light theory was relevant only to the (limited) extent that it informed the process of 
statutory interpretation. This demonstrates the limits of the green-light theory: the theory 
does not, by itself, tell us which kinds of executive conduct are ‘wrong’ and which are not; it 
only tells us what ought to be the appropriate legal response to a wrong. 
To illustrate this, consider a hypothetical case in which the court holds that there is 
“reasonable suspicion” of a breach of the applicant’s public right, and yet denies locus standi 
on the grounds of point (b) above because of the green-light theory. The Court would then, 
while declining to intervene directly, be exercising a power to send a strong signal to the 
Executive that its conduct may be questionable. In other words, while the green-light theory 
states that the courts’ role in controlling administrative action is limited, it does not follow 
that the courts have no role or that they necessarily must take a highly deferential stance. In 
this hypothetical case, the courts would still have played a role in “permit[ting] the 
administration to regulate itself”28 by highlighting areas which may need attention. 
The nature of the applicant’s rights 
The Court’s choosing to rule on the merits in Vellama was discretionary – it only did 
because “[it was] of the opinion that the Judge’s views on the procedural and substantive 
issues need[ed] clarification”.29 Thus, a key issue was the nature of the applicant’s rights – 
the court in Vellama could not have done so if the applicant had had no right. 
It is submitted that it is necessary to distinguish between two senses of “right”: (a) a primary 
right, such as the right to be represented in Parliament or a right against discrimination (the 
“first sense”); and (b) the secondary right to seek a remedy in court to enforce a primary 
right (the “second sense”). The existence of the former is a matter of substantive 
constitutional law; the existence of the latter is a procedural matter influenced by the choice 
of red-light or green-light theory. When discussing Tan Eng Hong v Attorney-General30, the 
Court used the word “right” in the first sense (“his private constitutional rights under 
Articles 9, 12, and 14 of the Constitution”31); when discussing Vellama, the word was used in 
the second sense (“her public right… to seek a declaration on the proper construction of 
Article 49 of the Constitution” (emphasis added)32). Again, the court was competent to rule 
on the merits in Vellama as the applicant did have a public right in the first sense. 
In Jeyaretnam, the Court discussed the distinction between public and private rights33, 
seemingly taking as a given that the applicant had no private right but rather only a right 
held in common with the public and “owed to the general class of affected persons as a 
whole”34. But later on, the Court suggested that the applicant was “unable to assert any rights 
                                                          
28 Supra n 8. 
29 [2013] 4 SLR 1, [45]. 
30 [2012] 4 SLR 476. 
31 Jeyaretnam, [51]. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Jeyaretnam, [29]ff. 
34 Jeyaretnam, [47]. 
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– private or public – … because there is none to be had: his claim is brought in the public 
interest” (emphasis added).35 With respect, the point could have been put more clearly: 
surely a public right can be vindicated for the sake of the public interest, and vindication of a 
private right can set a precedent which benefits the public interest. In other words, in this 
latter quotation, by “public interest” the Court was referring to a sense of general concern for 
public administration rather than a specific instance of public maladministration, and by 
“public right” it used the word “right” in the second sense, not the first. 
What, then, was the underlying public right (in the first sense) that was claimed in 
Jeyaretnam? In Vellama, the right to representation in Parliament was held to have been 
implicit in a Westminster-style system.36 Similarly, in Jeyaretnam, the right claimed may 
have been a general right of citizens to have public funds managed judiciously which is 
implicit in a parliamentary democracy. 
In short: in Jeyaretnam, the applicant had no right in the second sense because his right in 
the first sense, while existent, was not justiciable. It would not be accurate to say that the 
applicant had “no public right”: if that were so, then the court would have held that the 
applicant had had no complaint at all rather than that he should have taken the complaint to 
Parliament or the President.37 
This suggests that a distinction between “public rights” and “private rights” is not all there is: 
there may be some public rights (in the first sense) which do yield rights of enforceability in 
the courts by the public at large (in the second sense). This explains the court’s references to 
the issue of the gravity of the breach of rights,38 which otherwise one would think goes to the 
substantive stage rather than the leave stage. Thus, the Court held that in the case of, say, a 
“Cabinet Minister’s abuse of his wide-ranging powers”,39 a broader section of the public may 
well be granted locus standi.40 In fact, if the court had interpreted Art 144(1) differently so as 
to have found differently on the “reasonable suspicion” point, then it may have found 
differently on the “sufficient interest” point as well. 
The green-light approach is thus not necessarily inconsistent with the dictum from R v 
Somerset County Council, ex p Dixon that “[p]ublic law is not at base about rights… it is 
about wrongs… a person or organisation with no particular stake in the issue or the outcome 
may… wish and be well placed to call the attention of the court to an apparent misuse of 
public power”.41 The Court suggested that this sees judicial review as a Roman-style actio 
popularis at odds with the green-light theory in Singapore.42 But Dixon also said that “[i]n 
the majority of cases” it will be necessary to “demonstrate that the applicant is not a mere 
busybody”.43 Indeed, in Roman law, an actio popularis was not always open to just anybody: 
                                                          
35 Jeyaretnam, [51]. 
36 [2013] 4 SLR 1, [79]. 
37 As it did at [61]. 
38 Jeyaretnam, [61]ff. 
39 Jeyaretnam, [62]. 
40 Jeyaretnam, [64]. 
41 [1998] Env LR 111, 121; quoted in Jeyaretnam, [54]. 
42 Jeyaretnam, [54]. 
43 Ibid, 121. 
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sometimes special damage was needed44, or it was only a last resort if nobody with a specific 
interest sued.45 Similarly, the Court noted that, because “[t]he gravity of the breach would be 
a relevant consideration”,46 it may be that, despite the green-light theory, more people may 
be granted locus standi if other remedies are held unsatisfactory.47 
Rulings on the merits despite the applicant having no locus standi 
If the Court was willing to recognise this possibility explicitly, then why did the same Court 
in Vellama rule on the merits despite holding that the applicant had no locus standi, rather 
than holding that the issue was grave enough to warrant granting her locus standi? A 
possible answer is: by then, the applicant’s interest was “no more than a general desire to 
have Art 49 interpreted by the court”;48 thus, the court wished to exercise its discretion to 
rule on the merits while refusing to label as “grave” a situation where there was no 
substantial damage to the applicant’s interests. Again, this reflects the green-light theory: the 
court probably wished to promote legal certainty by answering the question, but without 
being seen to put itself in an “adversarial or combative relationship with the Executive”.49 
Conclusion 
The court’s linking practice in Singapore to public law theory is to be welcomed. This was not 
part of a blanket approach of “submiss[ion] to the Executive”:50 the Court not only reinforced 
the limitations of the courts’ proper role, but also highlighted the positive role of democratic 
processes in resolving disputes. Moreover, the green-light theory merely means that political 
remedies should be given primacy, not that that they are the only remedies available. 
Finally, the green-light theory played only a limited role in the ultimate outcome of this case. 
Indeed, for instance, if it had been successfully argued that the loan had been Wednesbury 
unreasonable or that the applicant had suffered tangible harm (even if not special damage), 
perhaps the applicant may have been granted standing by the court’s discretion or the 
Attorney-General may have been willing to commence an ex relatione action. 
About SLW Commentaries 
SLW Commentaries are short reviews or commentaries of the latest Singapore Supreme Court judgments, taking 
an analytical and “big picture” approach on legal developments. Although consisting primarily of commentaries 
on Supreme Court judgments, SLW Commentaries also include well-written articles on recent legislative changes. 
Interested contributors may write to SLW for more information. 
                                                          
44 Digest of Justinian, 43.8.2.2 (trans. Watson, 2009): “For public places serve both public and private uses… and 
we have as much right to enjoy them as anyone of the people has to prevent their misuse… if any work should be 
undertaken in a public place that causes private damage, suit may be brought…” (emphasis added).  
45 Ibid, 47.12.3.pr (trans. Watson, 2009): “Where it be said that a tomb has been violated by someone’s evil 
design… [and] [i]f there be no such person [who is affected] or if he does not wish to sue, I will give an action… to 
anyone who does wish to take action” (emphasis added). See also generally Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman 
Law, 3rd ed (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 694-5. 
46 Jeyaretnam, [61]. 
47 Jeyaretnam, [64]. 
48 [2013] 4 SLR 1, [43]. 
49 Supra n 4, [29]. 
50 Supra n 4, [14]. 
